

Issued

March 20, 2006

Climate

Markets

Nutrition

Agriculture

Livestock

 Civil
 Insecurity

 Emerging
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 Issues

Update on Humanitarian Crisis in Southern Somalia

- Update of Humanitarian Crisis in Southern Somalia:** The food security situation in crisis areas in the South is continuing to deteriorate at an accelerated rate.
 - Distress Population Migration:** Distress livestock and human migrations (both of whole and split families) are continuing and increasing throughout the worst affected regions (*page 1*)
 - Civil Insecurity:** Localized competition over limited and depleted water and pasture resources is continuing and increasing in several areas, especially in Juba and Bakool, but also incidents reported in Hiran and Lower Shabelle (*page 2*).
 - Malnutrition:** Nutritional status of a significant proportion of the population continues to be worrying and in some areas shows indications of deterioration (*page 2*).
 - Water Availability and Access:** Most water catchments in Gedo, Juba, Bay, and Bakool are now completely dry, driving both livestock and people to migrate in search of water. The little water that remains in many shallow wells, especially in Gedo, is contaminated and unfit for human and livestock consumption (*page 2*).
 - Livestock Body Conditions and Mortality:** Body conditions of most species of livestock are now severely weakened due to inadequate food and water. Although livestock deaths have been reported in Gedo for the last two months, reports now indicate that livestock are dying in Juba and parts of Bakool Region (*page 2*).
 - Cereal Availability and Purchasing Power:** Locally produced cereal supplies and stocks are significantly reduced throughout Southern Somalia and cereal prices in all regions are significantly increased from prior to the crisis. Cereals, local and imported, are currently available in the market, but significant proportion of the population – poor and middle wealth groups – do not have adequate purchasing power (*page 3*).
- Humanitarian Response to the Crisis in Southern Somalia:** Lack of clarity on whether on ongoing humanitarian response is operating at a scale necessary to mitigate the dire outcomes on lives and livelihoods (*page 4*).
- To What Extent Can Somali Social Support (including Remittances) Mitigate the Current Crisis?** Somali Social Support is another critical component of the ongoing response to the crisis. An outstanding question is – ‘to what extent can social support help mitigate the current crisis?’ (*page 5*)
- Early Warnings of High Risk to Famine if Gu 2006 Rains Are Below Normal:** Climate Forum predicts a high likelihood of near to below normal Gu '06 rainfall. FSAU/FEWSNET issues early warning that if the Gu '06 rains are below normal parts of Southern Somalia would be at a **High Risk of Famine/ Humanitarian Catastrophe** from July to Dec. 2006 (*page 6-7*).
- Field reports indicate that rains fell in parts of Juba and Gedo Region in the last week**, which would contribute to improved access to water and pasture. Although encouraging, these exceptionally early rains (one month early), are not indicative that the Gu '06 rains will be normal or above normal.


UPDATE OF HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SOUTHERN SOMALIA

DISTRESS MIGRATION

Distress population migrations, both of whole and split families, are continuing and increasing throughout southern Somalia due to a continuing deterioration in the food security crisis situation. **In Gedo Region**, the epicenter of the crisis, the majority of the pastoralists and agro-pastoralists have already either out-migrated to neighboring regions of Bay and Lower and Middle Juba or to riverine areas within Gedo in search of pasture and water for their livestock. Whole households and even whole villages have also migrated to riverine areas in search of water, income opportunities and social support. It is reported, though yet unconfirmed, that within the last month a large number of villagers from Gedo region crossed to Kenya in search of humanitarian assistance (mainly water).

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Somalia Seasonal Timeline & Key Events

In **Juba Region**, there are no new reports of significantly increased migration into or out of the region during February, but the region is already hosting one of the largest concentrations of in-migrated livestock and people from Gedo and Northeastern Kenya. FSAU's Enhanced Emergency Monitoring, however, does indicate an increase movement of population and livestock during February within the region towards riverine and *deshek* areas. This increased internal movement is prompted by the critical depletion of water in catchments and shallow wells throughout pastoral areas. It is estimated that 200-300 households out-migrated from Juba pastoral areas in February to riverine and *deshek* areas in search of pasture and water. Distress migrations are ongoing and increasing in **Bakool** and **Bay Regions**. For example, the three IDP camps in Wajid (Bakool) continue to receive a steady stream of IDPs from surrounding drought affected areas. Similarly, an estimated 130 and 200 households from Qandsadhare and Dinsor (Bay Region) are reported to have in-migrated to Baidoa, in search of employment opportunities and clan support. Preliminary reports indicate that some of the Southeast Pastoral cattle in **Bay Region** have begun to move into Middle Juba, and Southern Agro-pastoralists have begun to migrate into Burhakaba District (Bay Region) and **Lower Shabelle**. This new development in distressed livestock migration is an early sign of accelerated deterioration in the current crisis.

CIVIL INSECURITY

Localized competition over limited and depleted water and pasture resources continues to be a primary trigger point for increased tensions and conflict. During the month of February, reports of resource based conflicts and tensions were highest in the **Juba Region** (in Afmadow, Jilib, Hagar, Sakow and Buale districts), especially between pastoralists and riverine-deshek farmers over access to water and fodder (FSAU Enhancement Emergency Monitoring, February 15-28, 2006). Other areas reporting resource based tensions or conflicts during this same time period include **Bakool Region** (in Tieglow and Wajid districts) and in **Lower Shabelle Region** (in Qoryoley district). In the first part of March, politically motivated clan fights erupted in **Hiran Region** (in Buloburti district) which resulted in the loss of livelihood assets and a large population out-migration from Buloburti town. Political tensions still exist in **Mogadishu** between the Islamic Courts and the Alliance for the Restoration of Peace and Counter Terrorism.

MALNUTRITION

The nutrition situation for a significant proportion of the population in southern Somalia continues to be worrying and in some areas shows indications of deterioration (Map 1). Nutrition assessments conducted in **Bakool Region** by FSAU and partners in January 2006, indicate a poor nutrition situation, as well as poor dietary diversity in over 80% of the assessed population groups in the 24 hours preceding the assessments; a proportion of 37% and above of children suffering from common illnesses; and 80% and above do not have access to safe water for consumption. Qualitative data also indicates reduction in number and size of meals consumed.


Sentinel sites surveillance data in the other parts of southern and parts of central Somalia (**M. and L. Juba, Gedo, Hiran and Galgaduud Regions**) indicates high levels of acute malnutrition in many sites. Dietary diversity in many sites is also decreasing. Additionally, high numbers of severely malnourished children are being admitted to the TFCs (Therapeutic Feeding Centres) in Marerey and Jilib (**Middle Juba**). Limited access to quality food of sufficient quantity is the main factor contributing to the high levels of acute malnutrition. The poor nutrition situation is further exacerbated by high incidence of disease and inadequate access to water.

WATER AVAILABILITY AND ACCESS

Water availability and accessibility remains the most critical factor affecting livelihoods and lives throughout Southern Somalia. In **Gedo, Juba, Bay** and **Bakool Regions** most water catchments including *mugsids* (water holes), as well as most shallow wells are now completely dry. Lack of, and poor access to water, is driving both livestock and people to migrate in search of water to riverine areas, desheks, boreholes and other permanent water sources. Water trucking is inadequate to meet the demand for both livestock and human consumption, and water prices in most regions, are already at levels that are unaffordable for the poor and middle wealth groups. Functioning boreholes are not adequate to meet the needs of livestock and humans. More people and livestock are concentrating around permanent water points putting increased pressure on limited water supplies.

In **Gedo Region**, much of the water still available in shallow wells is contaminated and unfit for human and livestock consumption. In El Wak, Bardera and Barboharey districts, though unconfirmed, it is reported that 11 people died (including five children) due to the consumption of contaminated water last month. The level of the Juba river is below normal and the quality of the river water is poor (dark in colour, tastes bad, and stagnant in many locations). Throughout **Juba Region**, most inland water catchments are dry, while pasture in a 30km radius around functioning boreholes is overgrazed and depleted. Only the better-off pastoralists can afford water trucking to areas where pasture is still available. In **Bay and Bakool Regions**, water availability and accessibility is similarly affected. Water in Dinsor district (Bay Region) is brought from boreholes as far away as 120 km in Sakow (Middle Juba). In **Hiran Region**, water trucking is reported last month for the first time in villages like Hees, Beer-gadid and in others areas to minimize the problem of water shortages.

Map 1: Current Range Estimates of Malnutrition, March '06



LIVESTOCK BODY CONDITIONS AND MORTALITY

Body conditions of most species of livestock are now severely weakened (especially cattle, sheep and goats) due to inadequate pasture and water, as well as to the stress related to long trekking distances in search of water and pasture. Field reports indicate that in Gedo and Juba, better-off and upper middle pastoralists are already feeding their animals, especially cattle, with high priced fodder and cereals. Pastoralists in **Bay and Bakool Regions** have started feeding their livestock the dry grasses from the roofs of their huts in order to save their livestock.


Livestock mortality, although unconfirmed and difficult to fully assess, has been consistently reported in **Gedo Region** (roughly estimated by key informants at 60-70% cattle, 35% sheep, 40-50% goats and 15-20% camels). A new development is that livestock deaths are now being reported in parts of **Juba and Bakool Regions**. For example, unconfirmed reports indicate that up to 50 cattle, goats and sheep are dying around water points on a daily basis in Middle Juba Region, as well as a large number of livestock deaths in Rab Dhuree, El Berder and Hudur districts (Bakool). In Juba riverine areas, cattle are reported to be suffering from trypanosomiasis (tick borne disease) and endo-parasites, but most livestock owners can not afford to buy livestock drugs due to limited income from livestock and livestock product sales.

CEREAL AVAILABILITY AND PURCHASING POWER


As previously reported, locally produced cereal supplies and stocks are significantly reduced throughout Southern Somalia due to two consecutive seasons of below normal and failed crop production which has led to the lowest annual cereal production in more than ten years (FSAU 2005/06 Technical Series Report, February 22, 2006). This shortfall in local cereal supplies is clearly reflected in significantly increased cereal prices throughout the region, irrespective of which currency prices are expressed in i.e. Somali Shilling or US\$ (Figure 1). Sorghum prices are at all time high, even higher than maize which is generally more expensive. Maize prices are also high and increasing. Maize prices are highest in Juba Region – between October, '05 and January '06 they have been 55-75% higher than cereal prices in the Sorghum Belt and Shabelle Region (Figure 1). Maize prices in Juba Region are now 214% higher than they were prior to the drought (February 2003). Sorghum prices in the Sorghum Belt show the most dramatic increase in the last four months - an increase of 66% (since November '06) and are 185% higher they were in February 2003.

Despite the overall shortfall in local cereal production, local (produced within Somalia) and imported cereals (produced outside Somalia) are still available in the most of the markets throughout Southern Somalia according to FSAU's Enhanced Emergency Monitoring (Map 2). Only 5 out of 29 districts indicate that local cereals were not available in the market in the period of February 15-28, i.e. only imported cereals were available in these markets (Belet Hawa, Dolo, Luuq, Hudur and Belet Weyne districts).


Figure 1: Regional Average Monthly Cereal Prices (US\$)



Map 2: General Current Cereals Availability in Markets- February 15-28 '06



Map 3: Cereal Purchasing Power Adequacy February 15 - 28 '06



progress of the drought

Field reports indicate that although some regions have depleted most of their local cereal stocks, i.e. Juba, Gedo and Bakool, local cereals are flowing into these regions from Bay and Shabelle and imported cereals (from Ethiopia, Kenya and abroad) are consistently available in the markets throughout the southern region. Key informants (retailers, wholesalers, buyers and farmers) throughout the southern regions, however, are less confident that cereals will continue to be available in the market through July 2006. According to investigative interviews with these key informants, in only 18 out of 31 districts (58%), was it consistently reported that cereals would continue to be available in the markets through to July 2006 (FSAU Enhanced Emergency Monitoring, February 15-28 '06).

Purchasing power, or the ability of people to purchase cereals, is severely reduced and is one of the most critical problems facing most households. Inadequate or poor purchasing power is the result of a combination of significantly increased cereal prices and significantly reduced income (i.e. significantly decreased livestock prices and decreased availability of saleable livestock and livestock products; loss crop sale income; and limited casual labor opportunities). In most of **Gedo, Bakool, and Bay Regions, as well as parts of Hiran and Lower Shabelle**, poor and middle wealth groups are identified as having inadequate purchasing power for cereals (Map 3).

In Afmadow (L. Juba), Sakow and Buale (M. Juba), purchasing power is even more severely reduced and these areas have consistently faced the highest cereal prices in the south, i.e. 55-75% higher than cereal prices in the Sorghum Belt and Shabelle Region (October '05 and January '06). Poor and middle households are reported to be adopting a number of consumption coping strategies in response to their decreased purchasing power including, reducing the number of meals per day in both quantity and the number of meals/day (1-2 times instead of 3), switching to lower quality cheaper cereals, seeking gifts of food, increasing cereal purchases on credit (better-off and middle households), reliance on relatives, social support and humanitarian assistance.

HUMANITARIAN RESPONSE TO THE ONGOING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SOUTHERN SOMALIA

There is little consolidated information on actual humanitarian response to date, therefore, it is difficult to directly evaluate whether response is adequate in terms of identified needs, nor is it possible to accurately determine the extent of gaps in the response. It is not possible, therefore, at this time for FSAU to map identified needs versus response, as was done in the case of the Humanitarian Emergency in Sool Plateau and Nugal Valley (X, FSAU, X). However challenging, consolidation of response information is critical and a prerequisite to the successful monitoring and the implementation of an adequate and appropriate humanitarian response.

As indicated by the article above with an update of the humanitarian crisis, it is clear that the situation continues to deteriorate at an accelerated rate. What is not clear, however, is that despite on-going efforts the humanitarian response is operating at a scale necessary to mitigate dire outcomes on lives and livelihoods. For example, information available indicates that in February only 50% of people identified as requiring some form of immediate resource transfer (eg., food, cash, vouchers, etc.) received assistance through food aid.

Table 1: Actual Monthly Food Aid Distributions in Somalia, October '05 – February '06.

	Oct. '05 (mt)	Nov.'05 (mt)	Dec. '05 (mt)	Jan. '06 (mt)	Feb. '06 (mt)
CARE	3,460	0	5,285	0	5,306
WFP	4,773	1217	2,046	1,600	4,917
Total	8,233	1,217	7,331	1,600	10,223

Notes:

1. Source of food aid distribution data is WFP and CARE.
2. Figures are actual total food aid distributions, including relief, rehabilitation, supplemental feeding, and social support throughout the country.
3. CARE did not distribute food aid in Jan. '06 as a 'double' distribution was undertaken in Dec. 2005.

Table 2: Number of Food Aid Beneficiaries in Somalia, Feb. '06.

	Relief, Rehabilitation & Feeding Programming (ALL)	Relief Programming Only
CARE	263,610	246,114
WFP	290,872	233,268
	554,482	479,382

Notes:

1. Source of food aid beneficiary numbers is WFP and CARE.
2. Figures are total number of food aid beneficiaries (number of people) throughout the country.
3. FSAU estimated population in Humanitarian Emergency is 915,000 and in Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis is 715,000 (FSAU 2005/6 Post-Deyr Analysis, Feb. 2006).

Of additional concern, an important 'window of opportunity' for saving livelihood assets may have been missed, which could have the effect of prolonging the period of crisis and extending the time required for recovery. If this is the case, it would mean higher direct costs for Somali people who may lose lives and assets. It will also mean increased costs for the immediate humanitarian response, as well as increased investment required for livelihood recovery.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ACTION:

- Prioritize the sharing and consolidation of information on humanitarian response, with an explicit commitment to examine this information in relationship to needs.
- Ensure a comprehensive and adequate response in terms of geographic coverage, complementarily, and scale through effective coordination among all stakeholders.
- Scale up assistance for both immediate needs and livelihood support
- Prioritize using 'crisis as an opportunity' to address underlying causes.
- Continued commitment from Somali authorities to ensure humanitarian access.
- Sustained and increased support from the Somali Diaspora through social support networks, including remittances.

TO WHAT DEGREE CAN SOMALI SOCIAL SUPPORT (INCLUDING REMITTANCES) MITIGATE THE CURRENT HUMANITARIAN CRISIS IN SOUTHERN SOMALIA?

International and national humanitarian response is only one component of a response to a humanitarian crisis. Social support networks also play a vital role, especially in the context of Somalia – where social support networks are extensive and are a main conduit of resource transfers on a scale that some estimate to be roughly 67% of Gross Domestic Product and more than ten times the value of exports in terms of remittances alone¹.

In Somalia, access to social network support, including remittances (*hawala*) and other forms (for example, *irmaansi* (loan of milking animals), *xoolagoyn* (restocking), *aduud* (giving breeding stock to the poor), *abuur* (gifts of seeds), *doonfuul/hoorsi* (the loan of productive farm land)), is a cornerstone of disaster mitigation, resilience and recovery. This support, as one of the key assets in the basket of available livelihood assets, plays an important part in determining the vulnerability of individuals, households and groups. UNDP estimates that approximately one million Somalis send US\$1 billion to Somalia every year. Because of a strong tradition of sharing wealth they support their immediate families as well as extended family and distant relatives. Remittances soften the impact of disaster (for example, the economic impact of the livestock export ban imposed by Saudi Arabia since 1998, and the impacts of naturally triggered disaster, including the tsunami, floods and drought).

An outstanding question in the context of the current humanitarian crisis in Southern Somalia is **to what degree can or will social support (including remittances) help mitigate the current humanitarian crisis in Southern Somalia?** Although detailed knowledge of remittance flows is limited, FSAU and FEWS NET try to incorporate data on social support mechanisms into the analysis of food and livelihood security. However, quantifying the social support response is near impossible and fraught with nuances, but there are a number of known caveats that help shed light on the overall question.

Generally,

- **Remittance receipts are higher in central and northern Somalia, than in Southern Somalia.** The receipt of remittances is not homogenous throughout Somalia: receipt varies between regions and clans, within clans, between urban and rural areas, and within and between wealth groups.
- **Rural communities have less direct access to remittances than their urban counterparts.** It is the rural communities who are the most affected by the current crisis.
- **New regulatory measures in the last two years are believed to have resulted in smaller and more infrequent remittance transfers².** Following the wake of the post 9/11 anti-terror measures, new regulatory measures have led to increased transaction costs and reduced the presence of remittance companies in some countries. The impact on remittance flows to Somalia is believed to be significant, resulting in smaller and more infrequent transfers, as well as a slower response to crisis situations.
- **Social support (including remittances) in Southern Somalia has clearly not met expanding the humanitarian needs so far, nor prevented the deterioration in the crisis currently observed.** A saturation point is believed to exist in which the magnitude of the crisis and the number of people requiring support outstrips a community's ability to respond. There is point at which social support cannot continue to expand to meet increasing needs and this may have already been reached in the current crisis context.

In answer to the outstanding question – “to what degree can or will social support (including remittances) help mitigate the current humanitarian crisis in Southern Somalia?” - ***FSAU and FEWSNET conclude that although social support is and will continue to help mitigate the full impact of the current humanitarian crisis, it will be unable alone to fully mitigate or prevent a further deterioration in the human and livelihood catastrophe that is current underway.*** A stepped up and large scale response by all humanitarian actors is necessary to prevent the predicted humanitarian outcomes.

Footnotes:

¹See World Bank, Global Economic Prospects: Economic Implications of Remittances and Migration, No. 34320, 2006; Kent, Karin von Hippel, with M. Bradbury, “Social Facilitation, Development and the Diaspora”, Kings College London, November 2004; C. Horst, “Xawilaad: The Importance of Overseas Connections in the Livelihoods of Somali Refugees in Dadaab Refugee Camps in Kenya”, WPTC-02-14.


²IDS Newsletter, “New Regulations Restrict Remittances”, id21 Insights, Number 60, January 2006 (see www.id21.org)

CLIMATE OUTLOOK FORUM PREDICTS INCREASED LIKELIHOOD OF NEAR TO BELOW NORMAL GU 2006 RAINFALL

The 17th annual Greater Horn of Africa Climate Outlook Forum convened March 1-3 in Nairobi, Kenya in order to formulate consensus for the March to May rainfall season projections.

The forum of sector experts reviewed the state of the global climate system and its implications for the sub-region. Among the principal factors taken into account were the observed and predicted Sea Surface Temperature in the tropical Pacific Ocean, and over the tropical Atlantic and Indian Oceans.

Results released from this forum indicate an increased likelihood of near to below normal rainfall over much of the Greater Horn of Africa, including most of Somalia during the period March to May 2006 (Map X). Exceptions are some coastal areas of Juba Valley and parts of Awdal Region in the North, which may receive near to above normal *Gu* rains.



Source: ICPAC/FEWSNET

Source: LEWS

FUTURE OUTLOOK: SOMALIA FACES HIGH RISK OF FAMINE

Based on the 17th Annual Climate Forum's early prediction of near to below normal *Gu* 2006 rains season (April-June), FSAU and FEWSNET issued an early warning that parts of Southern Somalia are at **High Risk of Famine/Humanitarian Catastrophe** from July to December 2006 (Map 6 and FSAU Press Release, March 13, 2006). This is a further and significant deterioration in the current food security situation mainly due to severe lack of access and availability of food, water and pasture resulting from an abnormally severe drought and persistent civil insecurity.

Currently, there are an estimated 1.7 million people in North, Central and Southern Somalia facing conditions of Acute Food and Livelihood Crisis or Humanitarian Emergency (see FSAU 2005/06 Post *Deyr* Analysis, Technical Series IV.8, February 22, 2006). Preliminary estimates (in the worst case scenario of below normal *Gu* '06 rains) are that this number will **increase to 1.8 million** between July and December 2006. While seemingly not such a large increase, it does include a **major shift in severity**, with an over **40% increase** in the number of people facing **Humanitarian Emergency or Famine/Human Catastrophe** (from the current 900,000 to 1.3 million). Combining the IDP population, estimated at 400,000, means that approximately **2.2 million Somalis** would be facing a severe food security crisis.


IMPLICATIONS FOR RESPONSE:

While there is still the possibility that the *Gu* 2006 rains will be normal to above normal, given the predicted high likelihood of a below normal outcome—combined with the current precarious **Humanitarian Emergency** in Southern Somalia, and the sustained possibility of widespread conflict – it is prudent for all stakeholders to prepare for a worst case humanitarian and livelihood scenario. This worst case scenario has strong implications for the humanitarian response:

- *Increased urgency and priority to deliver a timelier, more comprehensive and coordinated humanitarian response* for the currently existing identified humanitarian needs. A humanitarian response is urgently required to meet the immediate needs for the most vulnerable (food, water and health). In addition, equal emphasis must be given to protecting and rehabilitating livelihood assets, as well as addressing underlying causes. Partial, isolated, poorly distributed and delayed humanitarian response will not break or slow the pace of the rapidly deteriorating food security situation.
- *Humanitarian response agencies need to develop plans and projects now for this likely worse case scenario*, as well as seek necessary resources for their implementation.
- *An increased imperative for adequate funding and international response* as compared with other on-going crises in the world.

In the scenario that the *Gu* '06 rains are normal to above normal, there will still be a need for continued assistance for the most vulnerable populations and full continuation of humanitarian assistance to support livelihood recovery focused on ameliorating extremely high asset losses and debt accumulation from the current drought. Equally critical under this scenario, is the timely delivery of appropriate seeds and tools before the onset of the rains, to ensure that agricultural and agro-pastoral households can plant their crops and fully benefit from these rains.

Map 6: Somalia Food Security Situation Analysis: Below Normal Gu '06 Rains Scenario Projections, July Through December '06



below normal gu rains projections

Recent and forthcoming publications and releases

- FSAU Nutrition Update, February, 2006
- FSAU/FEWSNET Market Data Update, February 2006
- FSAU/FEWSNET Climate Data Update, February 2006
- FEWSNET Somalia Food Security Emergency, February 2006
- FSAU Technical Series IV:8 Post Deyr 2005/06 Analysis, February 22, 2006
- FSAU Press Releases, March 13, 2006

Footnotes:

¹ For a brief background of Phase Classes see FSAU Technical Series 2005/06 Post Deyr Analysis, IV. 8, February 22, 2006

